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SPYING'S NO LARK: IT'S TIME TO GET TOUGH

IN the past, there has been a tendency among some State Dept. officials and other informed observers of the international scene to regard espionage as a largely irrelevant game, played between the KGB and the CIA in an effort to one-up each other.

But this idea that spying is a fit subject for fiction but hardly worth the attention of serious diplomats has been overtaken by recent events.

The appalling damage done by the Walker spy family, by the Howard defection from the CIA and by the Pelton revelations to Russia of the National Security Agency's code secrets has now been compounded to an unknown extent by the Marine guards' betrayal of their trust in Moscow and Leningrad.

As the damage assessment of what may have been lost laboriously proceeds, there is a new attitude in Washington towards Soviet espionage and what can be done about it.

Former national security advisor Gen. Brent Scowcroft summed it up when he remarked: "This is not fun and games. We have been hurt seriously, and much of it has been preventable."

Perhaps the least effective response has been the expression of moral outrage by administration and congressional leaders.

With its vast powers, huge resources and unlimited authority, the KGB has been operating from its Moscow headquarters for decades. Untouched by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, the KGB is committed to using every conceivable human weakness and technical device in order to discover the secrets of the U.S. and its allies and to protect its own.

To an extent that most Americans don't understand, the huge KGB espionage machine is driven by the Soviet regime's realization that it is behind the U.S. in both military and civilian high technology. By stealing from the West, the Sovi-

Senators urge death penalty for treason, curb on Red diplomats

ets plan to catch up and in the case of the Walker spy family they obtained a whole new technology for use in submarine warfare.

It is as certain as death and taxes that the KGB will continue to exploit every American vulnerability to steal our technology, discover our intentions and neutralize our agents. Rather than engaging in ineffectual protest, the administration and the Congress are beginning to realize that the time has come to close the loopholes and to eliminate long-standing vulnerability.

Before Congress adjourned for its Easter recess, Sens. Robert Dole (R-

Kan.) and William Roth (R-Del.) filed a series of bills that address many of the most pressing problems, and they are likely to have strong bipartisan support when Congress reconvenes.

First, as a deterrent against the sheer greed that has motivated many recent traitors, the senators propose a non-mandatory death penalty for espionage that meets constitutional standards. Congressional staffers predict a two-thirds majority if the bill can be gotten to the floor for a vote.

A major remaining vulnerability is the large number of East Bloc and Cuban diplomats that are allowed to operate in this country without the strict limitations that now apply to Soviet officials. Closing this loophole would sharply reduce the KGB ability to use satellite intelligence services to recruit Americans.

In addition to demanding that the Soviets either provide an alternate site for the new U.S. embassy in Moscow or make the present site acceptable, the senators wisely call for a halt in the construction of four new embassies in Eastern Europe until the President certifies that security precautions have been enforced.

Sens. Dole and Roth directly confront Secretary of State George Shultz in proposing pre-employment

and periodic polygraphs for security-related personnel and "spot" lie-detector tests for all official Americans overseas. Although polygraph tests cannot be relied upon as the sole determinant of guilt or innocence, they are a useful tool in any security investigation and a very powerful deterrent.

In the hands of trained operators in the CIA and NSA, they have proved their worth, and Secretary Shultz is known to be reconsidering his personal opposition to their wider use.

The issue of whether Marines should continue to be employed behind the Iron Curtain as a guard force has not been raised by the Senators, but two former CIA directors question this practice. There is no need for military protection in Moscow, and older, retired military or police officers would be less vulnerable.

Finally, in light of what happened in Moscow there is need for a change of attitude on the part of some State Dept. officers toward the threat of espionage.

As one of the leaders of the U.S. intelligence community explained: "State must understand that security is not an obstruction to diplomacy but essential to its effective conduct. State must treat the Moscow Embassy like an outpost fortress that has to be vigilantly defended."